by Adler Berriman Seal
You can’t swing a Southeast Asia military engagement in Washington these days without bumping up against “the lessons of history.” These lessons are meant to be instructive in the current military conflict, Johnson’s Vietnam to Obama’s Afghanistan.
This was on the cover of a recent issue of Newsweek: “How we (could have) won in Vietnam.” One wonders – why the parentheses? In the absence of real reporting from Afghanistan, Newsweek postures provocation.
Two positions are articulated. The first by Evan Thomas and John Barry (an argument so lacking in intellectual rigor and honesty it takes two men to construct it) is the old chestnut that Vietnam was winnable, if… Vietnam vet and US Senator John Kerry provides the far less wordy argument against an immediate military escalation in Afghanistan.
The main thrust of the Thomas/Barry argument is predicated on the work of a retired army colonel, Lewis Sorley. George Herring, who wrote a real history of the conflict, says he’s “rather appalled that Sorley’s book is being taken so seriously.” Not so Newsweek’s intrepid “experts,” by god, whose authority seems to spring from nothing more than appearing on its pages.
Sorley’s thesis is supposed to provide some guidance to war planners for strategic and tactical decisions in Afghanistan. This is how stupid it gets: when the authors told one Marine general (currently serving) that they were exploring parallels between Sorley’s thesis and the current situation in Afghanistan, he said, “You’re on to something there!” Really? As if the halls in the Pentagon aren’t ringing with the words quagmire, another Vietnam, gutless politicians, more troops.
They maintain, without really saying it, that victory in Vietnam was possible. The whole argument is one long train of subjunctive interrogatories, might, could, would, if only. The fact that the engine of that train is running on the dead air of failed ideas doesn’t seem to bother them.
The authors also praise the Phoenix Program, which targeted the Viet Cong leadership. The US relied heavily on informers, whose reliability was always suspect, to provide intelligence. One of the main tools of the program was assassination of suspected VC leaders. Does any of this sound familiar?
The Phoenix Program was a classic case of theory not comporting to reality, and very few (if any) of the people involved with Phoenix on the ground have claimed it was successful. The authors plainly get this wrong. Standing on the shoulders of Sorley’s shadow, they wonder, “If it [Vietnamization ie the tactics of the Phoenix Program] was working in Vietnam, will it work in Afghanistan?” This is as misinformed, as stupid a question as any asked about this current war. In Afghanistan, Phoenix is the model for the current strategy of “pacification.” Today it’s called “counterinsurgency.”
The glaring question, but the one rarely asked, remains this: why, when discussing Afghanistan, are we even talking about Vietnam? We already have an object lesson for Afghanistan, one we helped to create – the Soviet misadventure, the hubris that finally broke the bear’s back.
Is history only relevant when it’s reflexive? Are Americans so myopically distorted to believe that only our own history can provide guidance? The Soviets spent nine years and committed over 115,000 troops before finally concluding that the cost of “winning” wouldn’t add up to victory. And, unlike the US who at least gives lip service to preventing civilian casualties and sometimes even apologizes, the Soviets felt no such restraints about indiscriminate bombing and civilian deaths. Reports of mutilated Soviet corpses, often with their testicles shoved in their mouth, attest to the animosity Afghan fighters felt for their enemies. The Soviets blew all manner of hell out of the country, and rusting junkpiles of Soviet military equipment, like metaphors of the foundered empire, are still scattered about the land.
Here is the heart of the problem, both for our country and for journalism. America’s political and military leaders, and those in the media are asking the wrong questions, using the wrong “history,” drawing the wrong conclusions and believing a spurious mythology. This isn’t journalism, this isn’t even expertise, it’s the media justifying its own self-importance, which is why trust in Newsweek and other so-called mainstream media is falling to new lows. If media’s job is to inform, by any standard, Newsweek has failed.